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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

HERBERT BURTON and FLORENCE
BURTON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
ALAN H. COOMBS, CARLA H. COOMBS,
his wife, FOUR SEASONS MOTOR
INN, INC., a Utah corporation,
and FOUR SEASONS MOTOR INN, II,
INC., a Utah corporation,

Case No. 14254

Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPEAL

STATEMENT OF.KIND OF CASE
This is a Cross-Appeal by plaintiffs to require the
defendants to perform a settlement offer made prior to and at
the beginning of the trial court.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a trial before the Honorable J. Harlan Burns,
sitting without a jury, the Court found that the defendants
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were not bound by the later acceptance of an offer of settlement made at the beginning of the trial.

Other issues were

decided by the trial court which the defendant appealed to
this court.

However, those other appellate issues have been

dismissed by stipulation of plaintiffs, Herbert and Florence
Burton, and defendant, Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc.

The only

issue remaining to be heard by this court is the Cross-Appeal
of respondents.

Even though defendants are no longer appealing

any issues, for the sake of clarity, they will still be referred
^

to as the appellants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the determination of the lower
court affirmed as to respondents1 Cross-Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
DEFENDANTS MADE AN OFFER OF SETTLEMENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
TRIAL COURT. THE PLAINTIFFS REJECTED DEFENDANTS' OFFER AND
THEN LATER TENDERED ACCEPTANCE. THE COURT PROPERLY RULED
THAT PLAINTIFFS1 ACCEPTANCE WAS NOT BINDING UPON DEFENDANTS.
In an effort to preclude the necessity of a trial,
as well as to avoid the claim for anticipatory breach, defendants
filed with the court, about a week before trial, a pleading which
was entitled "Reaffirmation of Tender of Performance." (T-13)
By this pleading, the defendants not only reiterated their tender

-2-
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to allow the plaintiffs to resume their management of the first
motel under the terms of the written Management Agreement, but
they, in addition, offered to change the name of the second
motel, an act not even required by the terms of the Management
Agreement.

Such a tender by the defendants was obviously made

in an attempt to induce plaintiffs to forego their right of
action for anticipatory breach.

However, plaintiffs1 counsel,

in his opening statement at the commencement of trial, rejected
the defendantsf pleaded tender. (T-3)

Even when defendants1

counsel, in his opening statement, reasserted a tender of performance in an effort to settle the anticipatory breach claim,
the plaintiffs refused to accept it and instead proceeded with
the litigation on the issue of anticipatory breach as well as
other issues. (Respondents1 Brief, page 19).
The effect of plaintiffs1 failure to accept the
tender of performance at the commencement of the trial was to
then require the defendants to continue to assert and prosecute
their counterclaim based upon the plaintiffs1 breach of the
Management Agreement.

This included the claim that the plain-

tiffs had breached the contract by both non-performance and by
repudiation.

Obviously, the position which the defendants were

then forced to assert became totally inconsistent with any continuing tender of performance since their counterclaim asserted
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that the breach by the plaintiffs had the effect of rescinding
the contract so as to relieve the defendants of any performance
thereunder.

Thus, after the taking of testimony at trial com-

menced, the parties were pursuing the litigation of their
claim.

The defendants were contending that the plaintiffs had

breached the contract and had thereby brought it to an end and
the plaintiffs were asserting the same against the defendants.
As a part of their testimony during the first day of
trial, each of the plaintiffs in turn testified under oath that
they could not perform the Management Agreement.

(T-74-78).

Two concise rejections are:
11

Q
In light of what has happened over the past year
and a half do you think you could go back and work
with Mr. Coombs in an employee-employer relationship?
A

I couldn't."

(T-74).

.

" . . . All of these things go to show that Mr. Burton
feels that he could not, could not continue to work
under that arrangement, would not want to." (T-78).
Such was an additional clear repudiation of the contract and
a clear, express rejection of the defendants' previously-offered
tender of performance.
After the plaintiffs had fully presented their evidence, defendants made a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claim for anticipatory breach and presented arguments in
support of said motion, noting reasons why the plaintiffs
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had failed to prove the claim.

Other motions and arguments

were also made by the defendants at that time.

The court then

recessed the proceedings to consider the various motions/ and
after having done so, the court called all counsel into chambers and outlined his views on the merits of the motions,
indicating, among other things, that the court's impression
was that the plaintiffs' evidence on anticipatory breach was
insufficient.

Thus, at that time, the plaintiffs were informed

that they had, in effect, failed to prove their claim on the
issue of anticipatory breach.
The stated purpose of the court for informing the
parties concerning its impressions after the defendants' motions
had been made was to induce further good faith settlement negotiations between the parties in the hope of terminating continued
litigation on the remaining issues.

Thus, during the ensuing

noon recess, the attorneys for the parties assembled for the
purpose of settlement discussions.

During the course of such

discussions, certain alternative proposals for settlement were
discussed and rejected by plaintiffs.
Upon return of the parties from lunch, and immediately
before the trial resumed, plaintiffs' counsel approached counsel
for the defendants and announced that the plaintiffs were simply
going to tender into court an acceptance of the tender of
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performance filed by the defendants before trial.

In effect,

the plaintiffs completely bypassed the court-induced negotiations
for a compromise and instead rushed back into court in an attempt
to accept the tender of performance which had been made before
trial and after their sworn testimony that they could not, under
any cirexamstances, perform the Management Contract because of
their adverse feelings towards Mr. Coombs and a long list of
other circumstances, which Mr. Burton, with the prompting of his
attorney, detailed to the court. (T-74-78).
In other words, the plaintiffs attempted to take advantage of the situation before the court formally recorded its
granting of the defendants1 motion for dismissal of the anticipatory breach action.

This they did by attempting to quickly

accept the pre-trial tender of performance without giving any
explanation or assurance to the court or to Mr. Coombs as to
how they could perform the contract in view of their prior
testimony.
If the plaintiffs were to succeed by such a maneuver,
they would stand to get more than they were entitled to under
the Management Agreement, i.e., a change of the name of the
second motel, an inducement held out to plaintiffs prior to
trial.

This they would get without ever having to give any

consideration therefor.

The reason they didn't have to give

-6-
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up anything was because, by this time, they had received information from the court that their claim for anticipatory breach
was essentially without value.

They, in effect, at that point

had nothing to give.
At no time have the plaintiffs, or either of them,
demonstrated by any testimony or act that their purported
acceptance of the pre-trial offer of performance was in good
faith.

In fact, all indications and reasonable inferences

are to the contrary*

In view of the circumstances under which

the plaintiffs attempted acceptance and the later testimony of
Mr. Coombs concerning his observations regarding plaintiffs1
good faith, the burden rested with them to come forth with some
testimony or other evidence to satisfy the court on this point.
Under all the circumstances, the defendants must now
assert that the court should rule that the plaintiffs1 attempted
acceptance of the defendants1 offer of performance tendered by
way of pleading before commencement of the trial was not effect
tive for the following reasons?
1.

The acceptance was not made in good faith, but

was a simple legal maneuver in an effort to gain unfair advantage of the defendants at a time when both the court and the
defendants were attempting in good faith to solicit a compromised settlement.
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2.

The attempted acceptance of the pre-trial tender

of performance was not made until after it had been both expressly
and impliedly rejected by the plaintiffs.
3.

The said attempted acceptance fails since the

plaintiffs did not furnish the consideration which the defendants had bargained for in making the tender.
It will be recalled that Mr. Coombs testified at the
conclusion of the defendants1 evidence that he would not be
adverse to having the plaintiffs return to the management of
the motel if he could be satisfied that the plaintiffs were
acting in good faith.

Unfortunately, however, the plaintiffs

have done nothing to demonstrate any measure of good faith since
the dispute between the parties arose at the end of April 1973.
The evidence presented by the parties at the trial of this case
rather overwhelmingly demonstrates the lack of good faith of
the plaintiffs.

Evidence of their bad faith includes, but is

not limited to, (1) the plaintiffs1 consistent position since
April 28, 1973, that they would not return to work even though
they left their management responsibilities without any prior
notice and under circumstances which imposed a definite hardship
upon the defendants; (2) the plaintiffs1 sworn testimony at trial
that they could not return to a management of the motel; (3) the
obvious hate for the defendants demonstrated by Mrs Burton at
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the time of her emotional flare-up during her testimony on the
first day of trial; (4) the plaintiffs1 unwillingness to engage
in good faith settlement negotiations after the court had
requested them to do so during the noon recess of the second
day of trial; (5) the total failure of the plaintiffs to introduce any evidence to support their questioned good faith in
attempting acceptance of the defendants1 pre-trial tender;
(6) the plaintiffs1 attempt to accept the defendants1 pre-trial
tender of performance only after they had completed the presentation of their evidence and had received substantial notice from
the court that they had failed to prove their anticipatory breach
cause of action; and (7) the plaintiffs' apparent unwillingness
to disavow their sworn testimony that they are incapable of again
reassuming their management responsibilities.
Plaintiffs have further demonstrated their propensity
to act in bad faith by their admitted intentional design to remain
unemployed until after the trial of this case had been concluded.
All of the foregoing compels one to properly conclude
that the defendants are justified in concluding that the plaintiffs are not in good faith and that they are not likely to
suddenly reverse their past attitudes and practices so as to
re-establish a harmonious working relationship in the future, a
harmony which is essential to the proper operation of the business.
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It is universally held by the courts that the good
faith of the parties is a proper element to be considered.

As

stated at 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, Section 20:
"Bad faith is held to be a ground for equitable
relief or to constitute a foundation therefor. It
is said that the good faith of the defendant is a
proper and fundamental subject to be adjudged, and
that good faith or bad faith or intent when constituent and essential in a cause of action or defense
is a fact and may be alleged and proved as such."
Defendants feel that there is a presumption from the evidence
that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith in belatedly attempting
to accept the defendantsf pre-trial tender and that the court
should so find.
Defendants are reluctant to assert purely legal
defenses to the plaintiffs" attempted acceptance of the defendants1 pre-trial tender of performance since it is foreign to
the spirit in which they made their tenders.

However, such

legal defenses do exist, and we cannot help but feel we are
justified to assert them under the circumstances because the
attempted acceptance was, in the opinion of the defendants, a
bad-faith technical legal maneuver geared to take unfair advantage of the defendants in light of the circumstances as they
existed at the time. We feel compelled, in the interest of
justice, to assert such defenses so as to properly preclude
the plaintiffs from benefiting from such an act.
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Such defenses

include the claim that the offer had been rejected before
accepted and was, therefore, not outstanding at the time of
attempted acceptance, plus the claim that there was no consideration to support an agreement.
We feel that the court should consider the fact that
the plaintiffs1 stated acceptance of the tender was made (1)
after it had been rejected by the plaintiffs' counsel in his
opening statement (the plaintiffs make this admission on page
19 of their appeal brief) and (2) after the plaintiffs themselves had rejected it by sworn testimony to the effect that
they were incapable of returning to the management of the motel.
(T-74-79, parts quoted above).

It is elementary law that an

offer which is rejected ceases to be an outstanding offer.
(17 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 39, Rejection by Offeree)
"An offer is terminated by rejection and cannot
thereafter be accepted so as to create a contract.
Having once rejected the offer, the offeree cannnot
revive it by tendering acceptance.
"Any words or acts of the offeree indicating
that he declines the offer, or which justify the
offeror in inferring that the offeree intends not
to accept the offer or give it further consideration, amounts to a rejection."
It also seems apparent that after the offer was made and not
accepted, the offer was effectively withdrawn when the defendants were then forced to proceed with litigation of the respective claims that the contract had been terminated by renunciation.
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Furthermore, defendants feel that the court should
consider the fact that the pre-trial tender by the defendants
was in anticipation of avoiding litigation on the plaintiffs1
claim of anticipatory breach*

The court should thus recognize

that for the plaintiffs to be able to accept the tender of
performance after defendants had already been forced to litigate
that issue is to impose an agreement without granting the defendants the benefit of what they bargained for.

In other words,

the result of deciding that the acceptance was proper is to
let the plaintiffs "have their cake and eat it too."

The plain-

tiffs were required to give up nothing at the time of their
announced acceptance.

They had already been given their day

in court, and they had been given substantial notice by the
court that they had failed in their proof on the anticipatory
breach issue.

What then did they contribute as consideration?

Furthermore, why should they now be awarded the right to have
the name of the motel changed?

What benefits did the plaintiffs

bestow upon the defendants in exchange for the defendants'
concessions?
It seems inescapable that justice requires a resolution
of this issue in favor of the defendants, not the plaintiffs, as
the lower court concluded.

It is fundamental in appellate review

that the respondent (in this instance, the responding defendant)
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is entitled to have the court consider all the evidence in the
light most favorable to him*

Toomers Estate vs. Union Pacific

Railroad Company, 121 Utah 37, 2 39 Pac. 2d 163.

The reviewing

court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court and is not concerned with a preponderance of the evidence,
but only with the question of whether there is substantial evidence to sustain the judgment.

Leon Glazier and Sons, Inc., vs

Larson, 2 6 Utah 2d 429, 491 Pac. 2d 226.

On appeal, the evidence

in favor of the respondent must be considered to the exclusion
of contrary evidence.

Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc. vs. Hall,

18 Utah 2d 3, 414 Pac. 2d 89.

The court is further obliged to

consider uncontradicted evidence in composite with all of the
other evidence.

Super Tire Market vs. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122,

412 Pac. 2d 132.
SUMMARY
1.

Offer of settlement was submitted in writing to

the court and again restated during defendants1 opening arguments,
2.

Plaintiffs1 attorney rejected said offer and

proceeded with his evidence. (R-19).
3.

Defendant, Burton, rejected the offer a second and

third time during his testimony.

(T-74-79) .

4.

An offer once rejected cannot be revived.

5.

Acceptance was in bad faith.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon all the arguments and authorities as
cited herein, the respondent on this Cross-Appeal urges the
court as follows:
1.

To affirm the trial court in its decision that

the defendants were not bound by their offer of settlement.
2.

To award defendants1 costs of court and

reasonable attorney's fees for this appeal.
DATED the

/

day of November, 19 76.
Respectfully submitted:

C&ui^
/v ' ^T^^t^O^^
ALAN H. COOMBS
Attorney for Defendants,
Four Seasons Motor Inn II
and Alan H. Coombs
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I hereby certify that I served a copy of the
foregoing Appellants1 Response to Cross-Appeal to David
E. West, attorney for respondents, at his address, 1300
Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this

day of November, 1976.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

